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We Can, But Should We? A Response to Ethical Analysis of Brain 
Augmentation and Nanotechnology 
 
Introduction 
Science often progresses at rates faster than it can be regulated. Much research has been done in 
recent years surrounding nanotechnology, mechanisms comprised of various particles between 1 
and 100 nm in size that are capable of altering organic and non-organic molecules and atoms. 
The ethical implications of using such technology have been strongly debated among researchers 
and ethicists alike, particularly concerning the issue of human brain augmentation. While the 
definition of what constitutes brain augmentation can vary greatly, for the purposes of this essay, 
brain augmentation will be defined as the process by which an individual’s higher and lower 
order brain function are enhanced beyond their natural capabilities with invasive forms of 
intervention. Individuals that have no external alterations in the neural development cycle 
including neurogenesis, cell migration, cell differentiation, cell maturation, synaptogenesis, cell 
death and synaptic pruning, and myelogenesis, have “natural” brain function. Using the ethical 
theory of principlism and addressing the points offered in Caras and De Jesus’ paper Ethical 
Analysis of Brain Augmentation and Nanotechnology, this paper will argue that the use of 
nanotechnology for the purposes of brain augmentation are not morally permissible for they 
violate the principles of autonomy, non-maleficence, and justice.  
 
Informed Consent 
Caras and De Jesus suggest that treating patients with nanoparticles and technologies for clinical 
purposes presents two major issues. They begin by saying that (1) it is not known how 
nanoparticles will specifically interact with the human brain and body at this time, and (2) 
problems of informed consent can arise from a change in identity that may take place after the 
introduction of nanoparticles into the brain. They go on to argue that overall risks of using 
nanotechnology would be akin to the side effects one might see when taking prescribed 
medications, making the use of the technology potentially harmless. They finish by asserting the 
benefits could outweigh the possible harms, further testing should occur before the technology is 
introduced into healthy populations, and any human testing should be done for “treatment 
purposes” (7-8).   
 
The fact that it is unknown how the human body would respond to the introduction of 
nanoparticles would provide a major violation of the principal of autonomy. Caras and De Jesus’ 
focus on changes in identity post-implementation of the nanotechnology veers away from the 
basic components of informed consent that one should consider. It would be more correct to 
suggest that a patient would be unable to provide informed consent if they were using an 
untested treatment without knowing what the side effects could be for they could have any 
number of adverse responses to chemical properties of specific nanoparticles without knowing 
the risks beforehand. Additionally, the nanotechnology could influence brain function in ways 
that are more detrimental than beneficial and lead to a violation of non-maleficence as well. 
While the general biological layout of the brain is known, the function of each neuron, their 
neuritic connections, and synaptic regions have yet to be fully discovered. Even if one had access 
to such information, the activity of other neural cells, such as glial cells, and the role they play in 
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neural communication, neuroplasticity, and neural development is still relatively minimal. It is 
possible that not knowing the processes of certain neural functions can lead to a breach of non-
maleficence if nanotechnological, especially if interventions would be used without a patient’s 
proper informed consent. Furthermore, testing nanotechnology on humans for “treatment 
purposes only,” especially under the aforementioned assumptions, would breach other facets of 
autonomy and non-maleficence because potentially vulnerable populations would be exploited 
for the purpose of research advancement without any known benefits and disproportionate 
possibilities for risk. Consequently, that test population would likely be unable to provide proper 
informed consent for such treatment as well.  
 
Justice and Access 
Although nanotechnology has yet to reach this stage, implantation of neural mechanisms that 
could significantly improve cognitive performance beyond the normal human range could 
present issues where justice is concerned. Caras and De Jesus explain that providing neurological 
improvements for some but not others could lead to larger socioeconomic divisions between the 
upper and lower classes on both a local and global scale. Wealthier individuals would have 
increased access, presumably, to nano devices that could make them more powerful and 
intelligent which could lead to them looking down on those who do not have as much access. 
Caras and De Jesus go on to say that it is more probable that nanotechnology would only be used 
for medical interventions and, taking a more optimistic view, such technology could be offered 
to those in less developed countries in the future.  
 
Caras and De Jesus make a good point that only wealthy individuals having access to neural 
nanotechnological implants that can augment cognition beyond human limits could create a large 
divide between those who could afford such technology and those who could not. However, they 
do not go far enough with discussing access to the technology when it is used solely as a clinical 
tool. Assuming that nanotechnology and its implantation would be costly, it would be unlikely 
that insurance companies and federal assistance programs, often utilized by low-income 
individuals in the United States at least, would see such use of technology as a necessity given 
that there are alternative modes of care that may cost significantly less while still providing 
enough effective treatment. In this scenario, there would still be a distinct class division and 
disparity between those who could access the nanotechnology for treatment and those who 
would not be able to, despite the beneficial medical possibilities that may exist. In addition, 
should it be possible that all people in more developed countries could have access to 
nanotechnology for clinical purposes, it is unlikely that individuals in less developed countries 
would have the same access and resources to use such devices. Consequently, those with the 
neural nano implants would receive far better, or the best, care while those without would have 
to settle for less desirable and less effective care. Because the distribution of resources is likely 
to be unequitable, utilizing nanotechnology for clinical purposes, and especially unnecessary 
brain augmentation, would go against the principle of justice.  
 
Conclusion 
In their essay, Caras and De Jesus offered many points both in and against support of using 
nanotechnology for brain augmentation using a teleological ethical framework akin to 
utilitarianism. Using three of the four principles of autonomy, non-maleficence, and justice, this 
paper set out to analyze and argue with their specific points regarding informed consent and 
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justice. Caras and De Jesus asserted that the use of nanotechnology for brain augmentation could 
be so helpful for the user and other individuals on a global scale that the benefits would 
ultimately outweigh the risks when considering future application options. However, the lack of 
information about how nanoparticles specifically interact with the human body would make it 
impossible for an individual to provide proper informed consent at this point in time. 
Additionally, should nanotechnology actually become a clinical treatment option for 
neurological deficiencies or be accessible for recreational use, the economic disparities that exist 
would be further exacerbated. In short, while it may be somewhat beneficial to use 
nanotechnology, the principles of autonomy, non-maleficence, and justice must be at the fore 
when considering its use to ensure that they are not violated as they would be at this point in 
time. 
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